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The usual explanation for why the producers of a given product use different technologies
involves "vintage-capital": A firm understands the frontier technology, but can stifi prefer an
older, less efficient technology in which it has made specific physical and human capital
investments. This paper develops an alternative. "information-ban-ief' hypothesis: Fiis differ
in the technologies they use because it is costly for them to overcome the informational barriers
that separate them. The paper endogenizes both innovative and imitative effort. The industry
life-cycle implications --decliningprice and increasing output ..broadlyagree with the Gon-
Klepper data.
Empirically, the paper focuses on the slow slow spread of Diesel locomotives, which can
not be explained by the vintage-capital hypothesis alone. For instance, contrary 10 that
hypothesis, railroads were buying new steam locomotives long after the Diesel first came into
use --exactlyas the information-barrier hypothesis would imply.
Boyan Jovanevic Glenn MacDonald
Department of Economics Simon School of Business
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and NBERSolow (1957) observed that most growth in economic activity cannot be exp1aned by
increasing quantities of inputs producing output with a fixedtechnology.This paper models the
unexplained component and proposes a theory of the development and spread of new technology
at the industry level. The theory is motivated by evidence like Figure 1. Panel a) displays the
fraction of shipments of bits of dynamic random access memory by chip density and over time.
Low density (1 kilobyte) chips are displaced by those with higher density (4 k), which are then
taken over by those with yet higher density (16, then 64 and then 256 k). Meantime, the
quantity of bits delivered explodes and price declines dramatically. The bit industry displays the
waves of change and improvement stressed by Schumpeter (1934). Such data call for a theory
in which new developments occur periodically and do not spread instantaneously.
In the setup studied here, the growth and diffusion of technology are both endogenous.
Fii improve their know-how both by producing new knowledge- innovation-- and by learning
from others-- imitation. Both activities are costly and thus respond to the incentives provided
by the economic environment.'
Informational baniers appear to play an important role in explaining lags in the adoption
of technology: Nabseth and Ray (1974) and Rogers (1983) report that some firms learn of a
relevant new technology more than a decade before others. Moreover, being aware of a
technology is not the same as mastering it- According to Mansfield, Schwartz and Wagner
(1981) and Pakes and Shankerman (1984). imitation and product-development lags are long.
Thus, the spread of information seems to be gradual and costly. The hypotheses developed in
this paper flow from a learning process embodying infoimational bathers and implying costly
and gradual learning in equilibrium along with a non-degenerate distribution of technological
knowledge among flims in an industiy.'
The list of attempts to endogenize technological progress is long. At the macro level, see
Arrow (1962). Shell (1967). Lucas (988) and Romer (1990); at the micro level, Flaherty (1980)
and Spence (1984).
2Jovanovicand Rob (1989) also use informational barriers to generate a persistent non—
degeneracy in the distribution of technological knowledge, but they do not allow agents toJovaovic and MaCDOn1d 2
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Thevintage capital model is the primaiy alternative explanation for why firms use
different technologies; see, for example, Chari and Hopenhayn (1991). Tn that model, firms
have complete technological know-how, but use less than state-of-the-art technology when doing
so is profitable given the existing stock of assets specific to older technology. Here, firms use
different technologies because it is costly to overcome the informational barriers that define firm
boundaries, Innovation and imitation are alternative ways to make progress, and the relative
desirability of each depends on the firm's current know-how and the know-how of others.
The paper contains three types of results. The first three propositions deal with the
evolution of industry aggregates, and describe the precise sense in which technology improves,
output increases, and price declines as the industry matures. The technological diversity of firms
may or may ro persist forever, depending on the learning technology.
The second set of results focuses on innovative behavior in a cross section of firms at a
point in time. Under some conditions, small firms wifi, on average, grow faster than big firms.
There are two reasons why laggards may grow faster than leaders. The tirst is the diffusion of
technology from leaders to followers via imitation. The second is a cross-sectional "fishing out
effecf': if all firms are sampling new technologies from the same pool, leaders, who have
already acquired better technology, have less incentive to look for even better ones. As a result,
laggards look harder, and this causes at least partial convergence of output and technology over
firms as the industry matures.
The third set of results deals with the optiinality of equilibrium.Imitation creates
technological spifiovers which are akin to an externality, so equilibrium is not generally
"efficienf'. While a global optimum is not analyzed fully, there is a sense in which a social
planner would prefer mo i of all learning activities, both innovative and imitative.
These results are first presented in a general form. Then, a series of examples serve to
ifiustrate various aspects of the general results, and to point to some conclusions that do not
substitute between innovation and imitation.Jovanovjc nd MDonJd 3 CthiwD4ffu-'i
emergeat the general level. One of these results is that innovation and imitation tend to be
substitutes -- afirm relies mainly on one Or the other form of cost-reduction --and given the
way R&D spending is measured, this substitution possibility is likely to bias downward the
estimated rate of return to R&D. Another result is that diffusion-- an "equalizer"-- is triggered
bytechnologicalinequality which spawns the imitative effort neededto drivethe diffusion.
All these results hold in a partial equilibrium environment without entry or exit.
Jovanovic and MacDonald (1993) simplify this model, but also allowforentry andexit and
estimatethe resulting model on data from the U.S. automobile tire industry. Andolfatto and
MacDonald (1993) simplify too. but then embed the model in a general equilibrium framework.
Endogenous growth and cycles emerge; the model is estimated on aggregate U.S. post-war data.
I. Model
The model describes the evolution of a competitive market for a homogeneous product.
Demand is subject to exogenous random shocks as a result of income growth, variation in the
prices of related goods, etc. Supply is affected by random shocks too, but its development is
also governed by firms' introducing cost reducing technological improvements. Firms may get
better techniques either directly, through R & D, or indirectly by adopting methods already in
use by others. Both of these activities are costly and do not have fully predictable consequences.
A.csumptions
Assume discrete time and an infinite hoiizon. During each period a homogeneous
product is sold in a competitive market. Demand for the product is given by an inverse industry
demand function D(Qx), where Q,isthe quantity produced at date t and x1 is a vector of
demand shocks. D is downward sloping and continuous in Q,andx, is a realization of a Markov
process X, which has transition law F(x11 Ix,); x0 is given.
In addition to the homogeneous product interpretation emphasized here, Qcanalso be
thought of as a flow of services, and technologies as alternative ways to provide consumers withJovanovic and MaDonaJd 4
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theservices they ultimately desire. Thus, the model can accommodate product innovation as
well as process innovation.
The supply side of the model comprises a fixed continuum of price taking firms who
maximize expected discounted profits. To do sotheychoose a rate of output along with cost
reduction effort. There is no entry or exit
Let a finn's state of technological knowledge be denoted by 0,where0 0 ￿ 1, and
let the cross-firm distribution of know-how at t be v,, with given.' Thus, v,(9') is the fraction
of firms in the industry at date jhaving 0 ￿ 8'.
The firm's actions will be represented by a vector (q, /), where q is its rate of output and
1 is its learning efforts, including the level of R & D in the usual sense, efforts to evaluate
others' products, as well as less obvious endeavors such as experimentation with alternative ways
to compensate employees or structure financial arrangements with suppliers or distributors. At
date t.thefirms' net revenue is
p,q1—c(q,J1,O,x). (1)
Here xrepresentsinput prices, patent laws, the cost of researchers and of other products to be
analyzed, etc. There are no fed costs (i.e. c(010,O,x)=O, where 0=(O,.. ,O)), and costs are
strictly increasing and convex in (q. 1) and strictly decreasing in U when q0. A larger 0
At the outset, each firm's knowledge o,andhence the distribution of knowledge over
ru-ms,v0(8),is given exogenously. The nature of the distribution p0wifidepend on how new
the technology is. By assumption, the product is new, but the technology used to produce it
need not be entirely new.
If the technology is entirely new, then the initial distribution of knowledge may be
concentrated at one value of U --"theprimitive technology", If, on the other hand, the
technology is related to other technologies used to produce older products, then there may be
dispersion in i0.Buteven if firms are technologically all alike at date zero, they wifi soon
become different because the outcomes of firms' iimovation efforts are random and imperfectly
correlated.Javanovi mdMKDCnJJd 5
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thereforedenotes a better production technique. Further, ôcIôq is declining in 0; in this case,
given p, better production techniques imply greater Output, and firms can be described as
"largef' or "more technologically advanced" interchangeably.'
To specify the evolution of 0, let 'F(O' Iq,1,O,x,v) be the probability that the firm's know-
how next period is less than or equal to O, Thus, learning depends on the firm's state and
actions, and on the state of the industry, including the distribution of know-how rn use.
The learning technology 4' satisfies four conditions: (I) the firm cannot guarantee that it
will learn (t(Oq,l,O,x,v) > 0);(ii, thereis no "free" learning (t(OO,O,O,x,p)=1); (ui)the
firm'sknow-how does not deteriorate (t(O' q,1,O,x,v)=O ifO0 < 0); and (iv) increases in the
firm's efforts or know-how, as well as improvements in the know-how of others, add to learning
possibilities (if 4q 1￿1, &￿0. and jtdominatesvthen4'(O iJ&xit dominates
t(O' q.l,O,x,v).5
Maximization
Suppose that the state of the industry can be summarized by the pair (x,, i), and that
there exist the following equilibrium relationships at each f: p, =P(x,,p1)and v,.,1 =
Then,given equation (1) and the evolution of the state vector, the firm's optimal actions solve
the dynamic programming problem summarized by
That technology can be ranked by a scalar is a nontrivial restriction. Some technologies
cannot be ordered this way: A labor-saving technique may be superior when wages are high, but
need not be better when wages are low. Allowing for this in the present setup would entail that
the ranking of technology depend on x as well as 0.
5Whenever distribution functions are being compared, "dominance" wifi mean first order
stochastic dominance, and "improving" will refer to increasing in the sense of first order
stochastic dominance.Jovanovk and MxDoraid 6
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V(O,x,v)=
naj{P(xv)'-c(q17O7x)÷PJ V [o',x','x,v4it(o' qj,O,x,v)dF(x' x)}
(2)
where $isthe discount factor and V(O,x, v)the valueof the firm. The first two terms on the
right-hand side are the firm's cut-rent profit, while the integral is the expected present value one
period later, noting that next period's U and x are not known at present, and that they may
change. Let (q(O,x,),1(O,x, v)) be the (unique) action that achieves the maximum in the right
hand side of (2); (qj) is the firm's "policy ftinction".
Equilibrium
Equilibrium demands that firms select optimal policies, that supply equal demand, and
that expectations about the evolution of know-how are confirmed: A stationary equilibrium is
a set of functions {V,q. I,P, $}such that (1) Vsolves(2); (ii)(q, A)is the policy associated with
thissolution; (iii) P(x,.v) =D[J q(O,x,v)dv(O),x}; a n d flx,v) =
'FE Iq(O,.x,v)J(O,x,v),O,x,]dv(O).6
Implications
Theanalysisofimplications isgreatly simplified by ignoring learning-by-doing.
Learning-bydoing complicates because, as the industry evolves, price tendsto fall, giving firms
an incentive to shrink. With learning-by-doing, the tendency to contract output implies a
tendency to slow the learning process; the analysis becomes more complex and less intuitive.
Thus, assume c(q,l,O,x)=c(q,O,x)+c'(l,x)and that t is independent of q.
6Jovanovicand MacDonald (1991) prove existence and uniqueness of the policy function
and of equilibrium in this environment, and provides a collection of results on the long mn
behavior of the industry. The technical assumptions made to facilitate that analysis-- for
example, regularity conditions used to prove continuity of optimal policies- are suppressed here.Javiwvic sat MacDoaaid 7 CathtDØuion
Thefollowing general result underlies the time-series implications set out below .7It
states that aggregate knowledge advances gradually, and never stops entirely:
PROPOSITION 1: Assume learning begins at some point; i.e., p0forsome t. Then for any
sequence {x,}, (i)+dominatesv,; (ii)the distributionof know-how eventually settles at a long
mn distribution i;and(iii) this long mn distribution is never actually reached (v,patany
The intuition behind Proposition 1 is this: For part (i),thedistribution of technology can
never become worse, since a firm knowing technology 0wouldnever implement atechnology
inferior to 0.Forpart (ii), since the best technology is indexed by 0= I,the distribution of
technology can never advance beyond the one in which all firms know 0 =I.Thus, since the
distribution of technology can never fall back, it must either approach the distribution
conesponding to all knowing 0 =1,or one inferior to it, For part (iii), why must the
distribution of technology always increase? Suppose, to the contrary, that its advance halts at
some date t.Incomparison to r-l. the main difference is that the distribution of technology in
use is more advanced at t, Since this makes learning new techniques easier --recallthe final
restriction on 'P —anyfirm that tried to Learn at t-1 but failed, would wish to keep trying, in
which case learning could not halt as assumecL8
Proposition 1 states that if the distribution of know-how ever begins to improve-- as can
safely be assumed-- it wifi always improve. In this case the qualitative implications for industry
This result suimnarizes Propositions 2-S in Jovanovic and MacDonald (1991). Since a
formal statement and proof require significant additional notation, the full details are omitted
here.
This argument applies to a firm having some given information state in both periods.
Since the learning technology is such that learning something new cannot be assured, there is
always a positive fraction of firms that fail to learn, and so occupy the same information slate
during both periods.Jovanovk and MacDonaid 3
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outputand price that stem from the evolution of the distribution of know-ho-w and that are
derived in the next 3 propositions. are predicted to hold at all stages of the industiy 'S
development.
The distribution of know-how improves over time, and under competition the implied cost
reductions show up in a decline of the product price:
PROPOSITION 2: Ceteris paribus, the product price is lower at 1+1 than at t; i.e. for any x and
,P[x,t(x,)]￿ P(x,v).
PROOF:Using the definition of equilibrium, the monotonicity in 0 of q(O,x,v), and part (I) of
Proposition 1, P(x,v) = 5q(Oa,v)dv,(O),x]￿ D[ Jq(9,x,v)dzç÷1(O),x]= P[x,4(x,v)].
H
Proposition2 states that, given x, the price of output declines over time as supply shifts
to the right and demand remains stationary. More generally. however, price can temporarily
rise as a result of demand and supply shocks (X). The next result shows, however, that when
the shocks are i.i.d., p, declines in distribution. Let xbeLi.d., with distribution F().
Denote the distribution ftinction of p, conditional only on i', by P'(p j v) SAc4dF(x),where
A(p,v){xP(x,v) ￿ p}. Then p, is stochastically decreasing:
PROPOSITION 3: P('j ) dominates P(- I
PROOF:Since v, is stochastically increasing with i, and q(O,x,) is increasing in 0, P(x,v,) is
declining in I for fixed x.Itfollows that A(p,r,1)A(p,jç), and the claim follows.
Propositions 2 and 3 carry over to the evolution of industry output; for example, average
output stochastically increases over time. But not every firm wifi experience continual output
growth, even holding xconstant:Firms whose technological growth falls far enough below theJovanovk and MacDonald 9
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industryaverage will produce less at t+ 1 than at t if the anticipated price decline occurs.
Therefore, the cross-firm distribution of output may not always improve over time, since some
finns wifi experience a fall in output.Nevertheless, a positive result can be obtained by
"normalizing" the distribution of output: let normalized output be 7(O,x,v)q(O,x,v)Iq(,x.y),
where0 is the smallest value of 0inthe support of v0. Since q(O,x,v) is increasing in O
normalized output is distributed over [1,0)). Let be the price elasticity of the firm's supply
curve.
PROPOSITION 4: Ifis not increasing in 0, then for fixed x, the distribution of Q(O,x,v)
stochastically improves over time.
PROOF: For any q', let (n,x,q') be the solution for U to 4(O,x,p) = q'. If risnot increasing
in 0, then Oisincreasing in p. The fraction of firms at having normalized output at most
equal to q' is 1[9(p1,x,q')]. But, since v,1 dominates i's, v1[O(p,,x,q')]￿v,+i[(pir.t,q')]. ThiS
exceeds v,÷1[O,+1,x,q')] because of proposition 2, and because is increasing in p.
The intuition behind Proposition 4 is this: As i'd. evolves to Pff1twothings happen.
First, the output of finns that learned at t rises relative to that of the smallest finns, because
some small firms wifi not have learned at t, and thus will not raise output This output growth
is tempered by the downward pressure on the product price needed to clear the product market.
However, given the elasticity condition, the response of larger firms is proportionally no greater
than that of smaller firms, so their normalized output in fact rises as price falls. With size
measured by normalized output, this generates a declining proportion of small firms; that is, an
improved distribution of normalized output?
The elasticity condition is easily met For example c4(q,O,x) = q"E(O,x), for a> 1, yields
a price elasticity that is independent of 0.Further,the result's simplicity stems from the absence
of fixed costs, so that the smallest firms are always those who fail to learn anything at all.Jonxtvk and Macflonal4 10
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Leamin and Firm Growth: Propositions 2-4 were driven by the improvement of i'overtime.
In contrast, the next two propositions rely on how the firm's cunent know-how interacts with
its learning opportunities. There is a basic tension: Technological laggards may have a greater
incentive to improve through imitation, but the leaders may fmd it easier to learn stifi more
through innovation. Thus whether higher 0 leads to greater or lesser learning effort is unclear.
The next proposition deals with a case in which laggards will improve their technologies
more often than leaders. The following condition implies that greater U reduces learning effort:
for 0' ￿ 0, the learning technology is t(9' Il,O,xv)[1-t'(11.x,v)] +
wherethe range of 4" is [O 1] and for any x and p, 'P2isa distribution ftinction; for O <0,
t(O' •)=0, as before. This restriction breaks learning into a two-step process. Step one
determines whether the firm gets a technological draw, the probability of success being t'Q,x, it),
a function of learning effort but not know-how. In step two, if the firm does get a technological
draw, it comes from p2(9' Ix,v), which depends neither on effort nor know-how. In this setup,
sampling of new technology is as easy for laggards as it is for leaders. Of course, the firm will
reject any draw less than 6, and since the leaders have larger B'stheir returns from
technological sampling are less.
Since greater know-how does not make learning easier or cheaper, laggards, who have
more to gain from learning, wifi try harder and succeed more often:
PROPOSITION 5: The likelihood of learning a better technique, t'[/(O,xv),xv}[1 -
isdecreasing in 9.
PROOF: Since P is increasing in 8, it suffices to show that t'[l(O,x,)x,] is decreasing in 0.
To do so, let 5° <6'anddefine a c'[l(O°,x,v),x,v], t'(O°)t'[l(O°,x,),xv] and t2(O°) a
t2(&°)x,p); define &, t'(01) and t1(O) analogously. Writing p' in place of 4(x1v), that a firm












The factor in braces in (*) is equal to
—I 9(91, 1)di'2(O'lx,p')÷V(O°,x,v')—V(O',x,P')+t2(0')V(0',x,!')—t2(O°)V(0°1xpv').




Since 'P2 ￿ 1, this expression is at most
which is equal to zero. Thus the factor in braces in (*) is negative, in which case (1yields
t'[1(O°,x1p),x,v] t'[1(O',x,v)1x,v].JovovicDcnI4 12
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Proposition5 implies that smaller firms will learn more frequently, but not, however,
that they wifi necessarily grow faster; this is because the secular decline in price could affect
them more than it affects big firms. Something more must be assumed to guarantee faster
growth for smaller firms, and this is done in the next proposition. Given x, growth for a firm
that knows 0 is the random variable q(O',x,k(x,)JIq(O,x,v) -1;denote its distribution by
G(g18,x,w).
PROPOSITION 6: Ifis not decreasing in 0, then for fixed x, G(gIO,x.v)isstochastically
decreasing in 0.
PROOF: Let 0' > 9° and g =q[O',x,'(x,v)]/q(O',xv)-1;g ￿ 0.
s) Letg' > and define O(g',O,x,v)tobe the value of 6' solving q[O',x,4(x,v)} -
gSq(9y) = 0;0 is increasing in 0. T h e n I -G(gIO',x,v) =
'P2[(g',O',x,v)Ix,v}￿ 'F'[t(O°,x,v),x,v)[l • = 1-G(g'O°,x,v).T h e
inequality follows because t'[l(O,xv).x,} is decreasing in U (proof of Proposition 5) and is
increasing in 0.
ii) Let g' =g.Then O(g',O',x,v) =0'and G(g' IO',XMisthe probability that a firm with
know-how O fails to learn at t. Under the restriction on ,theprobability that a firm with know-
how 90growsby as little as g' is either 0 (whenever (x,p) differs from v) or equal to the
probability of failing to learn; the latter, according to Proposition 5. is rising in OY Thus g' is
the minimum in the support of G(g O',x,v) and below the minimum in the support of
G(g[8°,x,v), and (kg IO,x,v) ￿ G(g'(O',x,v). I
Therelation between Propositions 4 and 6 requires discussion. First, both results can
10q[O',x,4?(x,v)]/q(8),x,w)-q[O°,x,(x,v)]/q(O°x,v)￿ 0 isequivalentto
q[O',x,4(x,P)]/q[O°,x,tb(x,p)]q(O',x1v)/q(F,x,v) ￿ 0, which follows immediately from the
condition on and P[x,(x,v)] ￿ P(x1r).onnovk and MaCDOIIaJd 13
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holdsimultaneously since both admit the case in which the elasticity of supply is independent
of $.Inthis case the distribution of normalized output becomes less concentrated over time
while small firms have a greater tendency to grow. This occurs because the tendency for small
firms to grow does not eliminate the fact that some small firms fail to learn, and fall behind,
Propositions 5 and 6 are driven by the assumption that all firms sample from the same
technological pool. But some cost-reducing improvements are incremental --theybuild directly
on technology in place-- as opposed to more fundamental improvements based on discoveries
that are either new to all or new to the industry. When improvements are incremental,
technological leaders sample new technology from a better pool than laggards do. The
assumption that increments are sampled seems especially appropriate when it comes to
technological improvements introduced by current leaders. But it also makes sense for advances
achieved through imitation: A firm that is sufficiently far behind may well find it harder to
imitate an advanced technology than will a finn whose know-how is closer to the technology it
is trying to imitate. If learning is indeed of an "incremental" nature in this sense, and if this
effect is strong enough, then in contrast to the assertions of propositions S and 6, higher 0 can
raise the incentive to acquire new know-how. This effect is present in the example at the end
of the paper, in which there are but three technologies: low, medium and high. The invention
process endows medium tech firms with an advantage --throughinnovation they can become
high tech much easier than low tech firms can. As a result, in comparison to low tech finns,
medium tech firms devote more effort to innovation during the entire life-span of the industry;
Even though they have less to learn, and imitate less vigorously, they are more likely to succeed
in implementing better technology.
Propositions S and 6 continue to hold even if neither t' nor 'F2 depends on i'.That
is, they hold even f imitation is imp pssible.. These two propositions are driven entirely by the
cross-sectional fishing out effect Thus there are two distinct forces in the model that push the
population of firms towards technological convergence: (a) the diffusion of technology that
results from the laggards' efforts to imitate the leaders, and (b) the fishing out effect that causesIovic d McDon1d 14
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thelaggards to search harder. The first force likely shows up in any industry, while the second
arises only whenever technological laggards are about as efficient in finding better technologies
as the leaders are, as is more likely when new technology is not closely related to old
technology.
Optimality. Unless 1' does not depend on ,thedistribution of know-how in use affects how
firms learn- an externality; thus a social optimum is not likely to coincide with equilibrium.
The next result shows that there is a sense in which a social planner would prefer that firms
engage in more of all information gathering activities. &me of these activities may be imitative
in the sense that distribution of returns to learning efforts depends on others' know-how,
summarized by p.Othinformation gathering activities may have a return that does not depend
on p,andin this sense it is iuzovative.
Suppose that a social planner ranks outcomes by consumers' plus producers' surplus.
Equilibrium surplus is
E {' ff [J'D(z)ciz
—
Jc[q(OxM11(8x1v)O,x]dv(O)] },
whereQ(x,,v) q(&x1, v)dv(O) is industry output at t. Consider a nonzero vector of learning
efforts l. Suppose that at a date 1', firms' learning efforts are 1(O,ç,,) + ci', for > 0, but that
firms follow the equilibrium policy otherwise. Let W(e) denote the surplus generated by this
behavior.
PROPOSITION 7: Unless i' does not depend on ',dW(€)/d>0at =0.That is, the
planner prefers more learning efforts at tr.h1
'Theproof of Proposition 7 is in Jovanovic and MacDonald (1991). The argument requires
conditions guaranteeing differentiability of W. A related result is in Rustichini and Schmitz
(1991).Jovaav3vk sad MacDqaJJ 15
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Inpractice, the main policy tool employed to encourage innovative activity j patent
protection. Patents encourage innovation by stifling imitation. From this perspective
Proposition 7 may seem counter-intuitive in that it implies not just that innovation is too low in
equilibrium, but that imitation is too low as well; i.e. detening imitation is, in fact, detrimental,
This occurs because the result does not compare equilibrium to an alternative in which the
planner must intervene solely via a patent system. Rather, the planner has a richer set of policy
tools that influence both imitation and innovation, encouraging both more discoveries and faster
spread of what is found. Of course. equilibrium and optimum coincide if learning is independent
of others' know-how, i.e., if t does not depend on v.
This result suggests caution in the design of policies whose goal is to encourage cost
reduction efforts: If it is possible simultaneously to provide incentives for innovation and
imitation, then imitation is not necessarily a bad thing. The result is limited in two respects,
however. First, it does not compare equilibrium with the planner's globaloptimum;this
comparison will be made in an example, below.Second, the result states that the planner
would prefer a small increase in all learning activities, but it does not say what the planner's
favorite small change would look like.
The Lone Run. Is the best technology (0 =1)eventually uncovered? Wifi every firm
eventually learn U =1?Or wifi firms be different forever?" The answers depend on the
learning technology and cost function. If the marginal cost of learning is always positive, then,
at most a fraction of firms wifi ever use the best technology --notall firms wifi get it After
a point, firms have learned enough that the remaining scope for cost reduction becomes too
small to justify the effort needed to replace an existing method with the best one.
The above scenario admits the possibility that all firms wifi converge to a 0 < 1 and
stay there forever. But if, in addition, the learning technology is such that given 0 the firm
12Detailedanswers to these question are provided in Jovanovic and MacDonald (1991).Joyrovic and MacDonaid 16
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might,in one step, learn any greater 0(i.e.for all 9, the support of t(O' jlO,x,v) is [0,1]), then
heterogeneity persists forever. That is, when the learning technology can yield a diverse set of
new techniques, not offly do some firms never use the besttechnology,but also there is no
technology ultimately used by all firms --know-howmust remain dispersed. Since the output
of a finn and its value are both positively related to its know-how, long run dispersion of know-
how implies long mn dispersion of output and firm values. This means that even for mature
industries defmed by nanowly defmed commodities, the distribution of output should not be
concentrated, even though firms can imitate one another.
II. Innovation versus Imitation.
This section explores innovation and imitation in two examples of the general model that
ifiustrate the properties of equilibrium and of the social optimum. The second example is then
used to interpret the diffusion of diesel locomotives in the U.S. Neither example wifi have
aggregate risk and so X1 does not appear below.
The general model allowed for a vector of learning activities, 1. In the examples there
wifi be just two ways to learn --innovationand imitation. Innovative effort tgivesthe firm
a draw 0' from the distribution N(O'JO)with probability .Observethat N depends on the
firm's own know-how, but not the know-how of others. This is the sense in which effort t
isinnovative. Likewise, imitative effort, t,givesthe firm a draw from a distribution M(9' is)
thatdominates pandimproves whenever pdoes;M( .= p isan example.Effort ais
imitative since prepresentswhat others know and the draw does not depend on the firm's own
know-how. M wifi dominate pif,forexample, the firm can direct its imitative effort towards
the leaders. Assuming innovative and imitative luck are independent, t(9' k,p,0v)[1-
17+r,N(O'IO)][l-s+y.M(O'Iv)]forO'￿O, and t(O'Ii,p,O,) =0,otherwise.
Example1: ThreeTechnologies.Assume that 1) there are three technologies --= 1,=5
and 03 =15--withall finns knowing offly O at :=O; ii) costs arec(q,rj,pt,O) =Jovwiovic and MacDana! 17
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ii:)imitation is undirected: M(• I=v; iv) innovation is such that given a
draw from N, a flm knowing O learns O with probability .05 and °2 with probability .01, and
a flm knowing O learns °2 with probability .05;v)the discount factor is 3= .98; vi) demand IS
D(Q)a2'2.5Q. Let a denote the fraction of firms knowing 0 at t. Then the probability with
which a flm knowing only 0 learns O is .OSq +pPjt-.OS17eLvi,; that is, the probability of either
innovation or imitation yielding Ui,minusthe probability of bothdoingso. Expressions for the
probabilities of other transitions are analogous.
Figure 2 charts the industry's evolution. In Panel a) all firms start out with low tech
know-how, 00.Innovationsoon yields the discovery of medium tech know-how, 9, which
diffuses quickly due to imitation. High tech know-how, 021isalso discovered early-- since there
are many finns, any of which might uncover high tech- but its diffusion lags behind the
diffusion of medium tech; this occurs because high tech spreads more easily, via imitation, once
medium tech achieves wide use. Eventually high tech swamps the less efficient techniques.
Panels b) and c) display innovation and imitation effort for a low or medium tech firm. Initially,
since there are few firms to imitate, imitation effort is nil and all advance is due to innovation.
But as innovation breeds heterogeneity in know-how, the return to imitation rises rapidly and
imitation soon substitutes for innovation. Observe that, in comparison to medium tech, low tech
firms devote greater effort to imitation and less to innovation. This occurs because medium tech
firms have only the high tech population to imitate, while low tech finns can learn from any
medium or high tech finn In addition, the cost saving low tech firms realize by learning is
greater than the saving realized by medium tech, which explains why the difference in imitation
never disappears entirely.
Innovation and imitation are substitutes, and this can complicate empirical work on the
effects of R & D. For example, suppose that R & D data are primarily measures of innovative
efforts. Then regressions of industry output growth on R & D expenditures wifi typically
understate the influence of R & D on output growth; this occurs because the substitution
relationship between innovation and imitation tends to cause them to be negatively correlated,Jovanoic and MacDonald 18
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inwhich case the familiar omitted variable bias argument leads to the conclusion that the
estimated effect of R & D on growth will be biased downward. In the example, the conelation
of aggregate innovation expenditures with imitation expenditures is --23, and a regression of the
growth rate in output on innovation expenditures and a constant yields a slope coefficient of .53;
includingimitation expenditures in the regression raises this figure to .61.
Sincefirms can learn from one another, and learning leads to output growth, growth is
fastest when the scope for learning —differencesin know-how -isgreatest. Thus it should be
dispersion in output, not its mean, that drives imitation and raises growth. Figures 2(d) and 3(c
show that equilibrium and optimum both involve a positive conelation between the growth of
the industry's output, and the variance of output among firms. The growth rate of output falls
as the industry evolves, in agreement with observation by Gazi and Klepper (1982). This
generates a negative conelation between growth and level of output; however, growth and
variance in output are positively conelated since imitation occurs in response to variance in
know-how and results in greater subsequent output. Figures 2(e) and 3(e) display the declining
price paths implied by equilibrium and optimum.
Figure 3 depicts diffusion, ilmovation and imitation in a social optimum. In this example
the gains from improved know-how are large, and the dramatic difference between equilibrium
and optimum reflects this. New know-how is discovered more quickly and spreads faster, as
Proposition 7 would suggest. Indeed, the gains to getting high tech are so great that medium
tech never gains widespread use. Instead, great effort is spent on imitation and high tech
spreads quickly.
Example 2: Two Technologies: Assume that 1) there are only two values of 0 --lowtech, O
and high tech,O. ii)costs are again quadratic, but more general --
c(q,tj,p,O) = + + çjz2; iii) instead of being downward sloping, demand is perfectly
elastic at price po; iv) given innovation effort ',theprobability with which a low tech fim gets
high tech know-how via innovation is 3, where 6 C (0,1); and v) given imitation effort js andJovanovic and MacDonaJd 19
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thefraction ii,offirms knowing high tech at t. the probability with which imitation yields high
tech know-how is ,tvp,.13Thisexample resemblesmodelsfor the transmission of disease in
which pwouldbe the fraction of the population that is sick. In contrast to those models,
contagion is endogenous.
Let the netbenefitto learning be (v) =VIO11(v)]-V[O0,ft')J;A is falling in v since
imitation becomes easier as the number of high tech firms rises, raising V[O0,(p)],and
4O1 ,4(v)J is independent of v because demand is infinitely elastic. The first order conditions
characterizing a low tech fimi' s choice of tjanduare
—c+flo(1—,Qa()=O
—tS)àQ') =0.
Ii is not hard to check that i1VvLs(v) is increasing in p1thefirmts innovation effort declines
as pgrows,while its imitation effort rises. In what follows, this property wifi be assumed."
Intuitively. A(v) is the net benefit associated with obtaining high tech know how, which declines
over time; this encourages less of both methods of learning, a scale effect of a sort. However,
that imitation is becoming easier promotes a substitution of imitation for innovation. Thus. the
assumption made here is that the substitution effect dominates the scale effect
The variety of industry evolutions is ifiustrated by two polar cases. In "pure imitation",
13Thefraction of high-tech firms is a sufficient statistic for the distribution of technology
over firms, and that is why the symbol pisbonowed to denote this fraction here. This
specification of imitation assumes imitation by low tech firms can be partially directed towards
high tech firms; i.e. given that imitation effort has mmcd up some firm, the probability that the
flmi is high tech is Vv1> 1 (provided v,0).
14Thisproperty must hold over time in the sense that pA(v0)0, while v is rising over
time and Iim Vp,• g(p,)> 0.Jovanovic aM MaDonaid 20
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innovationis almost impossible --6= 0 --andevolution is driven by imitation)5 In "pure
innovation", imitation is ruled out These cases represent the extremes in terms of the
importance of informational linkages; they have distinct implications for, among other things,
the diffusion of technology, the distribution of output, and the productivity of R&D.
A. Diffusion of new technology. From the first order conditions, the rate of adoption of high
tech know-how is v,÷,-v, = $(-)A()1whichis small both early in the industry's evolution,
when p z 0, as well as much later, when p t 1; otherwise, diffusion occurs more quickly, and
in this sense, pure imitation must result in the familiar "S-shaped" diffusion pattern. In fact,
since A is declining in v, the maximal rate of diffusion occurs before a majority of firms use
high tech know-how. In contrast, pure innovation implies that the net return to acquiring high
tech know-how does not fall over time; this is because the composition of existing know-how
does not influence the scope for learning.'6 Thus innovative effort of low tech firms is constant
over time, and v,v, = (5)I+Iwhichis declining and concave in t. Thus under pure
innovation, diffusion is quickest at the outset, while under pure imitation, diffusion is initially
slow, then more rapid, and finally slow once again.
B. The time oath of the distribution of outimt...$ince price is constant over time, the outputs of
high and low tech firms are constant over time and average output is simply a rescaling of v,;
thus the results on diffusion apply immediately to mean output. The variance of output at I is
proportional to v1(1-v,). Thus given the diffusion paths just discussed, pure imitation yields
To allow high tech know how to emerge at all, 6 > 0 must be assumed. An alternative
is to set 6=0 and endow a few firms with high tech know how right at the start. Also, the first
version of this paper (Jovanovic and MacDonald. 1988) contains a variety of comparative
dynamics results for the pure models.
The infinite elasticity of demand plays a role here too. but when comparing the two pure
cases. it is the influence of the distribution of know how on learning possibilities that is central..lovanovic and McDcna1d 21
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heterogeneityin output slowly, with the rapid imitation phase driving it out quickly; pure
innovation results in a more rapid rise in heterogeneity and a more gradual decay.
C.Theproductivity of R & D spending. Under pure innovation there are no external effects
in the learning technology. Only low tech firms tly to progress, and their effort is constant.
Therefore, the observed productivity of R&D spending (i.e. diffusion per dollar of expenditure)
is a constant. Under pure imitation, on the other hand, the rise in the number of high tech firms
makes it easier for the low-tech firms to copy them,causingproductivity to rise over time.
Diffusion of the Diesel locomotive
The twentieth century has seen a host of innovations in the Railroad industry, but all ai
dwarfed by the replacement of steam engines by diesels. This section interprets the data on the
diffusion of diesels using the pure imitation model."
The first usable diesel locomotive was invented by Rudolf Diesel in 1912. Diesels were
first used in the U.S. in 1925, and by 1968 they had displaced steam engines entirely. Panel
a) of Figure 4 displays diesels in use in the U.S. (1925-67) as a fraction of the total number of
locomotives; the data are from the U.S. Bureau of the Census, Historical Statistics of the United
States. series Q296-9. Since this fraction is steadily rising, the distribution of technology
increases over time.
Spillovers cause the likelihood of switching technologies to depend on the distribution of
technology in use. Indeed, in the pure imitation model, the "hazard" rate Ii,(141-v)/(1-)
can be "backed out" of the diffusion data, and is predicted to be rising. Panel (b) of Figure 4
displays the hazard implied by the diffusion in panel (a). The hazard increases through most of
'InJovanovic and MacDonald (1988) the pure innovation model is used to study data on
the diffusion of mechanized loading techniques in the U.S. underground coal industry.
'8A few electric and "other" locomotives are ignored in what follows since, altogether, they
never amounted to more than 2% of the total number of locomotives in use.Jvnovjc .zid MacDoiid 22
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its range,and, in fact, only fails to do sowhenmore than 99% of locomotives were diesels; in
this case the denominator of the hazard-- I-v,-- is less than .01 and some enatic behavior for
measured Ii, is not surprising. The pure imitation model has the stronger implication that
imitation effort p= h/Vu,rises over time. Panel (c) displays ,calculatedfrom the diffusion
data in panel (a). Imitation effort generally rises and only fails to do so when almost all
locomotives in use are diesels.
While these ifiustrative calculations do not prove that an infoimational model underlies
these data, it is worth noting thatthemain alternative hypothesis --avintage capital model--
leaves much unexplained: First,new steam locomotives were produced long after the
introduction of diesels; see Interstate Commerce Commission (1950. Table A-4 and A-5). And
second, there is no evidence of a bell-shaped distribution of ages of locomotives at the time of
introduction of diesels; a bell-shape is key for a vintage explanation for the S-shape in Panel
a). Nor did the substitution of diesels for locomotives merely reflects the cheapening of oil
relative to coal. In fact, over the 1940-60 period, during which the primaiy displacement of
steam engines occurred, the relative price of oil to coal rose by about 15%; see U.S. Bureau of
the Census. Historical Statistics of theUnitedStates, Series M96, M139.
111. Conclusion.
This paper has analyzed competition among firms that differ only in teims of their
productive knowledge. Diffusion of technology takes time as a result of informational bathers
defining tirms Restrictions on observables were driven by this gradual spread of know-how.
Two key assumptions should be emphasized: (i) The infoimational unit is firm, and (ii)
Informational barriers take time and effort to overcome.
The firm is a legal entity: Patents are granted to firms, and infoimation-sharing
mechanisms such as patent-swapping anangements and licensing agreements are made among
flims. On these grounds it makes sense to think of the owner of a piece of information --
informationthat other firms can try to acquire --asa firm. Patents represent a barrier to theJovanovic andMacDonJd 23
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flowof implemented information among firms. Moreover, when a firm's employees work on
the same premises, they can and do share information among themselves differently and more
often than they do with others. These factors point to the firm as the appropriate unit of
analysis.
Important informational bathers may, however, exist within the firm, especially within
large firms. Holmstrom (1982) analyzes incentive problems that arise within the firm --
problemsthat may deter a plant manager from sharing his technological know-how with his
peers. Consistent with this idea, Mansfield (1963) has shown that the spread of a new
technology within the firm can take almost as long as its spread within the industry. To explain
diffusion lags within the flim this model must interpret them as resulting from informational
barriers between decision units making up the firm. Now if plants or individuals are treated as
the decision units, the model's predictions are about plants or individuals, not firms, Whatever
the decision unit is, however, the results apply to the discovery and spread of know-how in a
group of such decision units.
Although informational bathers among firms (and perhaps within firms too) seem to
matter, how much is not yet clear. In particular, is the spread of technological know-how slow
enough to explain much of the variance in firm size within industries, and in the observed timing
of the adoption of new technologies? The answers hinge on how easily firms can imitate one
another; indeed, if imitation were as easy as obtaining a blueprint or recipe, a theory focusing
on institutional features like patents and licenses would be more relevant than the theory
presented in this paper. But imitation is typically not that easy: using another's idea involves
more that simply obtaining a blueprint, just as mastering a subject demands more than buying
a textbook. This explains why finns in fact classify most of their R & D expenditures as
"applied", and why information lags probably are important for understanding how industries
evolve.Jovovjc and MacDonaid 24
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Figure 4. Diesel Locomotion in the U.S.
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